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but he rarely would be able to show that
the family members have exaggerated the
degree of sleeplessness, depression, or emotional trauma suffered." Id.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, relied on
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676 (1986) and
concluded that "the amount of harm one
causes does bear upon the extent of his personal responsibility." Booth, 107 S.Ct. at
2542 (emphasis added). In Tison, two
brothers who planned and assisted in their
father's escape from prison were sentenced
to death because in the course of their
escape, their father murdered four innocent poeple. Scalia's dissent pointed out
that the difference between life and death
for the two defendants was a matter
"wholly unrelated to the[ir] blameworthiness," yet they were held personally
responsible for the degree of harm that
they had caused.
The impact of this decision is so potentially far-reaching as to render the recent
"victims rights" legislation virtually
obsolete. Although Justice Powell specifically distinguishes between the use of the
VIS in capital sentencing hearings as
opposed to noncapital cases, the distinction can hardly withstand the weakest
attack on its logic. It remains to be seen
just how far the Court will go in interpreting the effects of this decision, but the
obvious implications suggest the beginnings of a new trend in "victims' rights."

- Natasha Sethi

u.s.

v. Salerno: FEDERAL BAIL
REFORM ACT DOES NOT
CONTRAVENE U_S.
CONSTITUTION
In United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct.
2095 (1987) the Supreme Court, as a matter of first impression, held that the 1984
Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.c. § 3141 et seq.,
(" Act") does not, on its face, violate either
the due process clause of the fifth amendment or the excessive bail clause of the
eighth amendment.
The Act authorizes the pretrial detention of arrestees who are charged with certain serious felonies and who are found,
after an adversary hearing, to pose a threat
to the safety of individuals or to the community.
Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafero
were arrested on March 21, 1986, on a 29
count indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire
fraud offenses, extortion and various
criminal gambling violations.
At arraignment, the government moved
to have the arrestees detained pursuant to
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§ 3142. Section 3142 provides that an
arrestee may be held without bail if no
condition or combination of conditions
would assure appearance at trial or assure
the safety of another person or the community. The government claimed that no
condition of release would assure the safety of any person or persons in the community. § 3142(e). The government
proffered evidence which showed that
Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese
Crime family and that Cafero was a "captain" in the family. Evidence also showed
that the two men had participated in wide
ranging conspiracies and that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspiracies.
The District Court granted the government's motion finding that the government met its burden of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of
release would insure the safety of the community or any person. United States v.
Salerno, 631 F.Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Both Salerno and Cafero appealed. They
contended that, to the extent the Act permits pretrial detention on the ground that
the arrestee is likely to commit future
crimes, the Act is unconstitutional on its
face.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit agreed. It concluded
that a person could not be detained consistent with due process merely because that
person was thought to present a danger to
the community. United States v. Salerno,
794 F.2d 64 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Second
Circuit reasoned that the system of
government in the United States holds persons accountable for past actions, and not
anticipated future actions. The government appealed.
The Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
speaking for the majority, began by stating
that because respondents had challenged
the Act on its face, they bore the burden
of showing that the Act could not pass
constitutional muster under any set of circumstances.
The fact that the Bail Reform Act
might operate unconstitutionally
under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it
wholly invalid... Schall v. Martin,
[467 U.S. 253 (1984)].

United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct at 2100.
The Court first addressed respondent's
challenge (if the Act as violative of both
substantive and procedural due process.
"Substantive due process" prevents the
government from engaging in conduct that
"shocks the conscience," Roehm v. Cali·

fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937). United States
v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
Respondent's main contention under
"substantive" due process was that the Act
authorized impermissible punishment
before any adjudication of guilt. The
Court rejected this premise, stating that
"[t]he mere fact that a person is detained
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion
that the government has imposed punishment." Id. at 2121, quoting Bell v. WolfISh,
441 U.S. 520, 532 (1979).
In determining whether the detention is
punitive or regulatory, the Court fashioned the test " 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it ,appears excessive in relation to the alternativt purpose assigned [to
it].' " Ibid., quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza·
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963);
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
Applying this test, the Court concluded
that the detention imposed falls on the
regulatory side of the dichotomy, thus no
infringement of due process exists.
The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial
detention provisions as punishment
for dangerous individuals. See S. Rep.
No. 98-225, p. 8. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential
solution to a pressing societal problem.
Id. at 4-7.

United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
The Court re-enforced the conclusion
that the Act was regulatory by focusing on
the limited circumstances with which a
person may be detained. Section 3142(F)
allows for detention only in cases involving crimes of violence, offenses which the
crime is life imprisonment or death,
serious drug offenses, or repeat offenders.
Furthermore, the Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.c. §3161, remains in effect. United
States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
Also persuasive to the Court was the
long line of decisions which upheld the
government's authority to invade an individual's interest in liberty. In each of those
cases, the Court found the government's
interest in detention compelling. In the
instant case "[t]he government's interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling." By enacting the
Bail Reform Act, Congress made specific
findings that individuals on bail awaiting
trial "are far more likely to be responsible
for dangerous acts in the community after

arrest." S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 6-7.
The Court found that the already compelling interest in preventing crime is
heightened when the government has convincing proof that the arrestee presents a
demonstrable danger to the community.
"Under these narrow circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its
greatest." United States v. Salerno, 107
S.Ct. 2095 at 2103.
When the government proves by clear
and convincing evidence that an
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the
community, we believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a
court may disable the arrestee from
executing that threat. Under these circumstances, we cannot categorically
state that pretrial detention "offends
some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934).

United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2103.
The Court thus concluded there was no
facial violation of substantive due process.
Turning to the facial challenge against
the procedures, the Court stated that "[t]o
sustain [the procedures] against such a
challenge, we need only find them "adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of
at least some persons charged with
crimes." Id. at 2103, quoting Schall v. Afar·
tin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). The Court then
went on to detail the procedures called for
under the Act.
Detainees have the right to counsel, to
testify, present information by proffer or
otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses.
The government has the burden and must
prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Section 3142(F); and the judge must
include written findings. §3142(i). There is
also immediate appellate review. §3245(c).
The Court concluded that the extensive
safeguards were sufficient to repel a facial
challenge against the procedures.
The Court turned finally to respondent's challenge based on the excessive bail
clause of the eighth amendment. The
Court stated that the U[p ]rimary function
of bail is to safeguard the Courts' role in
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of
defendants .... " United States v. Salerno,
107 S.Ct. at 2104. However, the Court
refused to interpret the bail clause in such
a fashion as to make bail available in all circumstances.
The Court stated that, "[Tlhe Eighth
Amendment does not prevent Congress

from defining the classes of cases in which
bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus,
in criminal cases bail is not compulsory
where the punishment may be death.
Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be
bailable." United States v. Salerno, 107
S.Ct. at 2105, quoting Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524, 545-546 (1952).
Thus, the Court expressly empowered
Congress to impose other considerations
other than questions of flight when deciding whether to allow an arrestee out on
bail.
We believe that when Congress has
mandated detention on the basis of a
compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth
Amendment does not require release
on bail.

United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2105.
In sum, the Supreme Court has found
that Congress may constitutionally
impose considerations other than flight to
the decision of whether an arrestee is bail
eligible. Where the considerations are
compelling, the Court will defer to the
will of Congress.

-Michael Scott Friedman

Arizona v. Mauro: POllCE ACTIONS
OF WI1NESSING AND
RECORDING A PRE-DETENTION
MEETING DID NOT CONSTITUTE
AN INTERROGATION IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA
In Arizona v. Mauro, - U.S. -, 107
S.Ct. 1931 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court held that an "interrogation" did not result from police actions of
recording and witnessing a predetention
meeting between the accused and his
spouse. In reversing a judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court, the Court decided
that Mauro's invocation of his Miranda
rights did not extend any privilege of confidentiality to remarks made to his wife in
a "private" meeting arranged by police at
the insistence of the defendant's spouse.
After admitting to police that he had
murdered his son, William Carl Mauro
was arrested and advised of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Mauro was twice read
his right to refuse to make any statement
without an attorney present. At Mauro's
request, police interrogation immediately
halted.
Meanwhile in another room at the police

station, Mrs. Mauro was also being questioned concerning the murder of her child.
After questioning, she became adamant in
her demand to meet with her husband.
Although reluctant at first, the police consented to the meeting only on the condition that an officer be present. The Mauros
were not consulted prior to their meeting,
and their brief conversation was recorded
by a tape recorder within their plain view.
During the meeting, Mrs. Mauro expressed
despair, while Mr. Mauro advised her not
to answer any questions until an attorney
was present. Mauro, 107 S.Ct. at 1933.
At trial, the defense put forth an insanity
plea which the prosecution rebutted by
playing back the recorded conversation,
and arguing that the recording showed
Mauro was sane on the day of the murder.
The trial court refused Mauro's motion to
suppress the recording, rejecting the
defense that it was a product of police
interrogation in violation of his Miranda
rights. Mauro was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death, and the present
appeal ensued.
In reversing the trial court decision, the
Arizona Supreme Court found that the
police had interrogated Mauro under
Miranda by allowing him to speak to his
wife in the presence of an officer. Arizona
'0. Mauro, 149 Ariz. 24, 716 P.2d 393
(1986). According to the court, the interrogation was invalid because Mauro had
requested counsel before any further questioning. The court based its holding on
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980),
which held that interrogation may include
practices "that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect." Id. at 30t.
Since two police officers had testified during pretrial hearings that they thought it
possible that Mauro might make
incriminating remarks during the meeting
with his spouse, the court found that Innis
applied, and overturned the trial court's
admission of the recorded conversation
into evidence.
The Supreme Court reversed, by a 5 to
4 margin. Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell focused on the issue of whether the
police actions were the "functional equivalent" of interrogation under Innis. In holding that no interrogation occurred, the
Court found that the officer present at the
meeting between the Mauros posed no
questions to the defendant. This had the
effect of rejecting the minority view,
embraced by Justice Stevens, that the
police "employed a powerful psychological ploy" against Mauro. Mauro, 107 S.Ct.
at 1937. Justice Stevens, for the dissent,
argued that the police actions overwhelmed Mauro because they did not pro-
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